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1 Introduction 
“If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together." 
-- African proverb. 
Citizen engagement is a phenomenon that has grown more commonplace. It is assumed to be part of 
the solution for the current societal issues, such as an aging population, rising demands for quality 
public services alongside declining budgets and effects of the global economic crisis (Pestoff, 2012, 
Sanz Corella, 2011). Citizen co-production takes the involvement one step further. Here the citizens 
do not simply participate in democracy, by being informed or engaged in the decision-making process. 
In co-production citizens are an essential part of the service delivery process, working side-by-side 
with professionals.  
The concept of co-production emerged in the late 70s/early 80s when, as a result of a notable rise in 
antipathy towards traditional and big government, new possibilities were conceived of (Alford 1998, 
2002; Bovaird 2007; Bovaird & Loeffler 2012). Studies like those of Sundeen (1988) and Jakobsen 
(2012) show several motives for governments to encourage co-production. After all, co-production is 
considered a source of improved service quality and production efficiency (Ostrom, 1996). Moreover, 
co-production can also be linked to increased social capital (Marshall, 2004), though Sundeen (1988) 
claims that the most obvious reason behind the interest in the concept is the possibility of budgetary 
reductions, particularly at municipal government level.  
2 Problem statement 
The benefit for the local government, however, only emphasises one side of the collaboration. For co-
production to work efficiently there is a heavy reliance on the citizens. And what motivates citizen-co-
producers to participate is exactly what this paper aims to answer.  
However, we first need to establish a concrete definition of co-production before exploring previous 
theories on the topic. Ostrom’s definitions are those most-often mentioned and used, so we will base 
our definition on her work (Ostrom, 1999). We consider co-production as the collaboration of citizens 
and public service agents in the provision of public services. This cooperation is supposed to enhance 
the quality and/or quantity of the services the citizens and/or their families use. Co-producers are thus 
different from volunteers in the traditional sense, as the public services they provide are services the 
participants and/or their families also use (Verschuere, Brandsen & Pestoff, 2012). 
This paper provides empirical evidence on co-production and citizens’ motivations in Belgium. It also  
challenges the economic rational choice assumption that people are solely motivated to participate 
because they have a material interest to do so (Alford, 1998; Verschuere et al, 2012).  
Current case studies on co-production have focused mainly on records from the education or health 
care sector (Voorberg, Bekkers & Tummers, 2013). That is why, in this study we have selected a 
community development project. The project, located within a diverse neighbourhood, should also 
provide us with a wider range of respondents. This is an attempt to avoid the classic insider/outsider 
dynamic of co-production that often excludes specific social groups (Brandsen & Helderman, 2012; 
Rosentraub and Sharp in Porter, 2012).  
The paper starts  with a theoretical framework that explains both co-production, as well as the 
research that has been done hitherto. This will provide us with an overview of the possible motives of 
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co-producers. From this framework we will subsequently deduce a series of hypotheses which we will 
then operationalize for our case study.  
Once we have acquired the hypotheses and our field data, we use SPSS to pinpoint the variables that 
influence the motivations and analyse our results to explain what factors trigger citizens co-
production. Lastly we discuss theoretical and practical implications and consider future research 
possibilities.  
 
3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Academic research has recently made great advances on the subject of motivations of co-producers. 
In this study we will draw on previous work on motivation in co-production as a baseline (Sharp 1978, 
Alford 2002, Asquier 2013, Verschuere at al. 2012, van Eijk & Steen, 2014).  
Most researchers begin with the separation of two motives: the personal and the circumstantial 
motivations. The personal motives are, as the name implies, based on the citizen’s personal criteria 
and character (van Eijk & Steen, 2014). Personal motives are most often divided into two separate 
incentives: the extrinsic and the intrinsic motivations (Alford, 2002). But, besides these personal 
motivations, Pestoff (2012) points to other important influences such as the ease of becoming 
involved and the salience of the services delivered. These circumstantial influences are related to the 
time and effort required to become involved, or as Pestoff (2012) calls them, the transaction costs. 
These factors provide answers to the citizens’ questions on why they would participate and how easy 
it really is to get involved (Verschuere et al., 2012). Also, one needs to bear in mind that these are 
often necessary conditions. After all, without the possibility of finding the co-production project and 
considering it important, the citizen will not think of the option of participating  
Figure 1: Theoretical map  
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The figure above summarizes the four sets of factors that may explain why people co-produce or why 
they do not. In the following parts of this paper, we will elaborate on these motives, and deduce some 
hypotheses.  
3.2 Personal - Extrinsic: Citizens co-produce (more) because they are extrinsically motivated. 
 
We begin with the extrinsic personal incentives. These are tangible benefits such as money, goods or 
services and have been rigorously discussed in literature on co-production. In theory the co-producers 
expect to be rewarded through material means for their input (Alford, 2002). As Verschuere et al. 
(2012) explain, this incentive can be both monetary (e.g. a voucher or free goods) or non-monetary 
(e.g. safety, non-exclusion). It assumes that people are benefit-maximizers who only co-produce if it 
is in their own interest (in case the benefits outweigh the costs). This viewpoint is largely inspired by 
the public choice theory and so this incentive is considered, especially from an economic perspective, 
to be the main reason why people co-produce (Verschuere et al., 2012). 
Apart from this rewards-incentive suggested by Sharp, Alford (2002) reports a second extrinsic 
incentive: the avoidance of sanctions (Asquer, 2013). Alford’s (2002) research confirms that both 
incentives are used when dealing with co-production. Sanctions can be divided into two categories: 
firstly, when citizens are penalized by a reduction or suspension of benefits when they do not meet 
their obligations (Alford, 2011), and secondly as the nonmaterial motivation for compliance, such as 
fear of social condemnation and moral values (Alford, 2002). 
Alford (2002), however, also points out that neither incentives are very effective. The sanctions are at 
best ineffective, at worst even counterproductive. Indeed, citizens do not experience co-production 
positively when threatened. As he explains in later work (Alford, 2011) sanctions are bad generators 
of those complex positive actions that are essential to co-production. Acting co-productively, contrary 
to refraining from something prohibited, is similar to moving from a lethargic to an active state, which 
calls for what Alford (2011) defines as consummate co-operation. In other words, judgment, 
forethought and discretion are required to perform. Thus the citizens will want to recall an information 
input, to gain new skills or attributes and to utilize an organizational output. Sanctions do not connect 
with these impulses and will mostly demotivate citizens from contributing (Alford, 2011). 
For the material incentives Alford found a similar constraint. People are not conditioned as the dog in 
the Pavlovian experiment, and therefore they will not solely co-produce because of a material reward. 
Interestingly, he discovered, on the contrary, that although the motives behind co-production can very 
well develop from self-interest, these benefits are often found to be far more complex than purely 
monetary benefits (Alford, 2002). 
When Asquer (2013) describes the different incentives for citizens to co-produce he first establishes, 
as Alford (2002) did, that both extrinsic rewards are generally understood to be non- or minimally 
influential when discussing the motivation to co-produce. There is one exception to the rule, in 
circumstances of, what Verschuere et al. (2012) call, mundane tasks. This applies when citizens are 
asked to perform relatively simple, frequent and short tasks, without costing them too much time or 
effort. Here the extrinsic incentive will motivate as there is no direct benefit linked to the co-
production (Asquer, 2013). 
Still, authors who have previously written about this subject, agree that this self-interest incentive has 
some severe limitations in explaining why people still co-produce. Even economists from public choice 
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schools accept that other values, besides the monetary incentive, can influence a person’s actions 
(Verschuere et al., 2012).  
3.3 Personal – Intrinsic: Citizens co-produce (more) because of intrinsic influences. 
 
The intrinsic or non-material motivations have a wide array of different motives. Intrinsic mostly 
means that the motivation exists within an individual. So, rather than relying on rewards or sanctions 
one is motivated by an interest or the enjoyment of performing the task. 
Alford (2002) divides intrinsic motivations into four types: intrinsic, solidary, expressive and normative 
influences. He defines intrinsic motivation as “the clients’ sense of self-determination and 
competence (Alford 2002, p 45)”. In other words, by co-producing the citizens’ self-esteem can be 
enhanced and their sense of hope and purpose restored. Van Eijk and Steen (2014) agree with this 
definition, claiming intrinsic rewards assisted in enhancing one’s sense of competence and self-
efficacy.  
But within the definition of intrinsic motivation there are three more types. The first, the solidary 
incentives, also from Sharp’s account (1987 as referred to in Alford, 2002) are defined as the rewards 
and enjoyment that come of associating with others. Alford (2002) refers to this as sociality. The 
citizens’ willingness to participate is directly connected to their desire to belong, to socialize, to be a 
member of a group and have a sense of identification and being well-regarded but also the simple fun 
and enjoyment of working together. Verschuere et al. (2012) define social incentives as the enjoyment 
one would associate with interacting with other people as well as the aim to gain their approval or 
avoid their disapproval.  
Another intrinsic incentive mentioned by multiple authors is the normative purpose. This incentive 
coaxes citizens to co-produce simply because it is ‘the norm’, because their belief systems claim it to 
be right or logical. As Verschuere et al. (2012) define it, here citizens are guided by their base values 
such as their belief in democracy or their citizen-duty.  
Finally, the last intrinsic incentive is also Sharp’s (1978) third motivation type: the expressive incentive. 
These are the intangible rewards that create the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to a 
worthwhile cause (Wilson 1973 as mentioned in Alford, 2002). As Boyle (2006) discovers in his case 
study in the UK, co-producers often considered themselves traditional volunteers, claiming their main 
motive is wanting to do something for their community. Though they are aware of the reciprocal 
benefits, it rarely turns out to be an important incentive. 
Another term often associated with co-production is altruism. More specifically the concept of 
‘impure’ altruism is mentioned. As Steen (2006) explains, altruism and egoism can be combined in one 
motivating factor: citizens could be motivated through some private or selfish reason beside the ‘pure’ 
altruistic motive (Govekar & Govekar, 2002 as referred to by Steen 2006). This generates the term 
‘impure’ altruism. Through her research Steen (2006) confirmed the possibility of rational thinking, 
explaining that an altruistic person can consider the benefits to others and him/herself when 
participating and thus creating ‘impure’ altruism. 
Following these considerations and the subsequent citizen participation, Steen and van Eijk (2012) 
point out there will be an assessment of the effectiveness of their input and actions. The citizens 
involved will consider whether or not their goals have been reached and if the outcome is preferable. 
However, the actual outcome does not have to be the expected one entirely, as during the 
participation new insights can develop and the resulting outcome will thus be judged in a positive way 
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even if it is not what was expected. More importantly, the process of the engagement itself will be 
evaluated and thus the effectiveness of participating (van Eijk & Steen, 2014). 
We can recapitulate that the intrinsic motivation is a complex reasoning that happens mostly inside 
someone. Whether it is as a group or alone, people behave co-productively because they believe the 
solidarity or the consequences, is a valuable and gratifying experience.  
3.4 Circumstantial – Ease of Involvement : Citizens will co-produce (more) when they perceive 
it easy to get involved 
 
An often mentioned and important factor in the context is the question as to how easy it is for citizens 
to get involved. As Verschuere et al. (2012) explain, ease of citizen involvement can be dependent on 
several factors, such as the distance to a service provider, whether or not information is easily 
available about this service and its provision et cetera. This circumstantial motive is directly related to 
the time and effort citizens are required to put in. Pestoff (2012) defines these as transaction costs. 
The lower these costs are, the easier it is for citizens to participate.  
Another aspect of this ease of involvement is the efficacy, or whether or not the citizens feel 
competent enough to engage in co-production. Here we look into van Eijk and Steen’s (2014) answer 
as they discuss a concept from political science, internal efficacy. They define internal efficacy as “the 
feeling of personal competence to understand and affect the delivery of the service at hand and to 
participate in the mechanism of co-production.” (van Eijk & Steen, 2014)  
As argued above, whether co-production is perceived by citizens as an ‘easy’ task  depends on the 
nature of the task, but also on the efforts of the government to provide both information and aid to 
the participating citizens as well as those that are interested, by being present for them both physically 
and mentally (e.g. the experiment of Jakobsen, 2012). Providing an information database through 
folders, websites, social media and briefings may be another important means to facilitate 
involvement.  
3.5 Circumstantial – Salience : Citizens will co-produce (more) when they perceive the co-
production project to be of enduring importance to them. 
 
Citizens’ involvement will also depend on the salience of the service. This deals with the question as 
to whether or not the service is truly of importance for the citizen or their loved ones and if the service 
affects them, their lives and life chances directly or indirectly. When these questions are answered 
positively, and citizens feel that the service is important, they will be more likely to get involved and 
be motivated in the co-production of social services (Pestoff, 2012). 
The salience of a service is indirectly connected to the durability of that service. Pestoff (2012) stresses 
the necessary distinction between enduring and non-enduring tasks. After all, many social services 
provided, belong to the first category and have therefore an immediate and important impact on the 
life of the people receiving them. The salience of these services guarantees a high involvement and 
interest of their clients in the further development of the services. Typical examples of these enduring 
social services are preschool services, education, elderly care, handicap care, as well as preventive and 
long-term health care, et cetera. The ability of users to leave these services is slim, as they are locked 
in for a long time. Therefore they have to use their involvement and voice as a way to influence or 
better the services (Pestoff, 2012). 
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3.6 Overview of hypotheses 
 
In conclusion one can say that academics have found a number of motivations and reasons that can 
prompt a citizen to co-produce, but these motivations are never stand-alone when influencing a 
citizen to co-produce. The authors who discovered the motivations above have found and described 
several distinctions between and nuances of these specific motivational factors (van Eijk & Steen, 
2014). This needs to be taken into account when considering the empirical results of our study. From 
the motivations listed above, we can build ten hypotheses to test in our case study: 
 
Table 3-1: Hypotheses 
 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Case study 
 
In this study, we focus on a community development project, De Torekes, in a deprived 
neighbourhood in the city of Ghent (Belgium). ‘Torekes’ is the name for the complementary currency 
that is offered to citizens in exchange for co-production in their neighbourhood. Initially, the ‘Torekes’ 
project was scheduled to run for only a year, 2011. But its success was soon evident and it was 
continued until today. ‘Torekes’ is only part of the larger community initiative in the neighbourhood. 
Another part is ‘De Site’ ‘which is located on an old industry floor in the same neighbourhood. The 
project of De Site is where many urban development projects unfold. The location holds a city field, a 
football square, a bicycle repair shop, a community oven, several coops of chickens, a playground and 
200 small gardens for city farming. The choice for city farming is a logical one, as it answers most to 
the needs of the inhabitants, both socially (they can meet others, converse, engage and work) as well 
Extrinsic A Material 
rewards 
Citizens co-produce (more) because they are offered material rewards in 
return. 
Extrinsic B Material 
sanctions 
Citizens co-produce (more) because they are threatened with material 
sanctions. 
Extrinsic C Immaterial 
rewards 
Citizens co-produce (more) because they are offered immaterial rewards 
in return. 
Extrinsic D Immaterial 
sanctions 
Citizens co-produce (more) because they are afraid of immaterial 
sanctions. 
Intrinsic E Solidary Citizens co-produce (more) because they desire to belong & socialize. 
Intrinsic F Normative Citizens co-produce (more) because their belief systems claim it to be right 
or logical. 
Intrinsic G Expressive Citizens co-produce (more) because it gives them the sense of satisfaction 
of having contributed to a worthwhile cause. 
Intrinsic H Effectiveness Citizens co-produce (more) when their goals have been reached and if the 
outcome is preferable. 
Circumstantial 
I 
Ease of 
Involvement 
Citizens will co-produce (more) when they perceive it easy to get involved. 
Circumstantial 
J 
Salience Citizens will co-produce (more) when they perceive the co-production 
project to be of enduring importance/salience to them. 
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as physically (healthy food produce, a healthy environment and plenty of activities) (Debruyn & De 
Bisschop, 2013). The rent to acquire one of the 200 plots is paid with the ‘Torekes’ currency, 
encouraging the citizens to participate in local initiatives to earn the complementary coin. The 
products from ‘De Site’ farming project are sold and used in a social grocery and the social restaurant. 
Again, here too citizens can volunteer their time to work in the kitchens or behind the till.  
In this project, citizens are thus stimulated to participate in community development of a deprived 
neighbourhood. It is a particular case to study (motivations of) co-production, as many works on co-
production so far focused on the education or health care sectors (Voorberg, Bekkers & Tummers, 
2013). It gives us the opportunity to focus on a group of co-producers that are rarely under scrutiny: 
people living in deprived neighbourhoods, often also in a vulnerable socio-economic position. 
Studying such projects can perhaps help to avoid the classic insider/outsider dynamic of co-
production, where specific social groups cannot break the barrier to participate (Brandsen & 
Helderman, 2012; Rosentraub and Sharp in Porter, 2012).  
4.2 Data collection and analysis 
 
This research has a deductive character (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2008), as we want to test the 
hypotheses developed above regarding citizens’ motivations to be involved in the project. 
Data collection 
For each hypothesis we used three statements that supported the motive. These statements were 
presented via a survey to the co-producing citizens. Only the extrinsic hypothesis B, on material 
sanctions, was inapplicable to this case as there are no material sanctions for non-participants. As 
longer surveys tend to increase non-response (Saunders et al, 2008) we tried to limit the statements 
solely to relevant details that may impact motivation. Hence the importance of good literature, so we 
can focus on potentially interesting motives. All statements were presented on a seven-point Likert 
scale (see Annex 1). The scales, used to measure attitudes, requires respondents to choose from a 
scale how much they agree or disagree with the statement (Saunders et al., 2008).  
It is important to note that some of the statements are applicable to more than one hypothesis, 
dependent on how you interpret both the statement and the hypothesis. This can be explained 
because several of our distinctions are closely related (e.g. participating out of solidary motives, or out 
of fear of immaterial sanctions). We attempt to avoid confusion by the way the sentences are built 
and arranging them into similar categories within the survey. After all, Saunders et al. (2008) also state 
that a survey should be organised in such a way that similar questions or statements are placed within 
the same category in order to make it easier for the respondents to follow. 
As the main speaking language in Ghent is Dutch, the survey was translated into Dutch. But, as there 
is a large concentration of Turkish speakers in the community, we had to translate the survey to 
Turkish as well (see Annex 2). 
As these are quantitative measurements, we relied on the statistical program SPSS to analyse the 
survey.  
Data analysis 
The acquired data was researched in three steps.  
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First, a data reduction was needed. This was done by computing the summated scales of the three 
statements belonging to a theoretical cluster. These statements were used to probe the underlying 
motives that we were trying to measure. By doing so we obtain, per respondent, a score on nine 
indexes that are related to our nine hypotheses (as previously mentioned Hypothesis B is excluded as 
there are no material sanctions implemented in the case study). This data reduction was accompanied 
with a reliability test. 
We do this by using Cronbach’s alpha, the most common measure of internal consistency 
("reliability"). We apply the test on all 9 indexes. In order to be reliable, the Cronbach’s alpha needs 
to be greater than 0.6 (the results of the reliability test can be found in Annex 1 ). 
Secondly, a Paired Samples T-test is used to compare the related means of the nine indexes. This T-
test tests the null hypothesis (the difference between the two related means is 0). For example, when 
comparing hypothesis A and E, our null-hypothesis would be: “There is no statistically significant  
difference between A and E.” 
In the SPSS data we find the statistically significant difference between the two by comparing sig. 
(probability) value to .01. So, if p <.01 then we reject the null hypothesis of no difference, but if p > 
0.01 we retain the null hypothesis of no difference. We perform the Paired Samples T-test on the total 
sample (Annex 3).  
We then use the ANOVA test to measure whether or not there are significant differences of means 
when comparing the subgroups in our sample. The ANOVA test delivers identical results as the T-test, 
but can provide information when studying more than two groups (such as different age categories). 
The test compares the amount of variation between groups with the amount of variation within the 
group. For the ANOVA test, we will use p≤0.05 and p≤0.01 as the significance levels to compare the p- 
values to. This will show us whether there are clear significant differences within the personal 
characteristics, age, gender, nationality and employment (see Annex 4).  
 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The survey was completed by 37 respondents, 11 men and 26 women. The majority (54%) of the 
respondents were of Belgian nationality and completed the survey in Dutch (59.5%). The average age 
of the co-producers was 42, with 24% of the participants within the category 35-44. Almost half (48%) 
was unemployed and the average participant had been working for ‘Torekes’ for 14 months. The table 
below shows the descriptive statistics of our sample of respondents. 
Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics 
Age N  
37 
Mean  
42, 62  
Median  
42 
Mode 
31 
Std. Dev 
15,410 
Min. 
19 
Max. 
68 
Months 
Participating 
N  
27 
Mean  
13.56 
Median  
12 
Mode 
1 
Std. Dev 
14,241 
Min. 
1 
Max. 
48 
 
10 
 
Variable Frequency Percent 
Gender 
 
   
Male 11 29,7 % 
Female 26 70,3 % 
Age categories 
 
   
18-34 14 37,8 % 
35-54 12 32,4% 
55+ 11 29,7 % 
Employment 
 
   
Active1 8 21,6% 
Inactive2 29 78,4% 
Survey language 
 
   
Dutch 22 59,5 % 
Turkish 15 40,5 % 
 
  
                                                          
1 To achieve a higher N and thus more significant results, we combined the variables ‘student’ and ‘employed’ 
under one common denominator ‘active’. 
2 We did the same for ‘inactive’ which comprises of the variables ‘retired’, ‘unemployed’ and ‘other’. 
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5.2 Total Sample 
 
We first discuss the results for the total sample of respondents. The question we want to answer is: 
what drives the respondents to co-produce. The figure below shows the mean scores per index. We 
thus have nine theoretical indexes on which respondents could answer to what extent this motivation 
drives them to be involved, to co-produce. Scores range from 1 (no motivational factor) to 7 (very 
important motivational factor).  
As the figure shows, we can establish a distinct division between two groups of indexes. 
The first group, the greatest motivators for these citizen-co-producers, are: expressive (mean =5,57), 
ease of involvement (mean =5,40), effectiveness (mean =5,15), salience (mean =5,00), normative 
(mean =4,96) and  solidary (mean =4,91). 
The second group, of least influential motives, in this case study are the extrinsic motives: immaterial 
sanctions (mean =3,36), material rewards (mean =4,13) and immaterial rewards (mean =4,35). In 
order to find whether there are statistically significant differences between motivational factors, we 
conducted paired sample T-tests. The results of this analysis can be found in annex 3. It shows that 
the expressive motive has positive significant differences with almost every other motive, making it 
the most important motive for our co-producers. We can similarly see that immaterial sanctions is the 
least motivating of all our motives, showing the most significant (negative) differences with the others.  
 
Figure 2: visualization of the different motivations for co-production, total sample 
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5.3 Sub samples: Are there distinct differences within the descriptive statistics? 
 
We also analyse subsamples of co-producers by comparing indexes based on personal characteristics 
like age, gender, ethnicity and occupational status (active/inactive) (see above table 5-1). The primary 
conclusions from these analyses (see Annex 4) are the following: 
1. There is no significant difference to be found when comparing male and female respondents’ 
answers. Hence, gender does not influence the motives of people to co-produce. (see table 
4.1 in Annex 4) 
2. Concerning age categories there was a significant difference for the motives material rewards 
( p = .024) and ease of involvement (p=.036). Once we perform a post hoc test, two significant 
differences between groups become clear. (see table 4.2 in Annex 4) 
a. The group of 55+ (mean = 5,4) are significantly more motivated by material rewards 
than the group 18-34 (mean = 3,4). 
b. The group of 55+ (mean = 6,4) are significantly more motivated by ease of 
involvement than the group 35-54 (mean = 5). 
3. When considering the employment of our respondents there is only one significant difference 
regarding material rewards (p =.006). Here we find that “Inactive” co-producers (mean = 4,6) 
are more motivated by material rewards than “actively employed” co-producers (mean = 2,5). 
(see table 4.3 in Annex 4) 
4. Lastly there are significant distinctions between the Dutch-speaking and Turkish-speaking 
citizens. Turkish-speaking citizens seem more influenced by material rewards (p=.011) and 
immaterial sanctions (p=.019) and Dutch speakers are more influenced by the expressive 
motive (p=.037). (see table 4.4 in Annex 4) 
a. Turkish speakers (mean = 5,1) score higher on motivation through material rewards 
compared to Dutch speakers (mean = 3,4). 
b. Turkish speakers (mean = 4,2) score higher on motivation through immaterial 
sanctions compared to Dutch speakers ( mean = 3). 
c. Dutch speakers (mean = 5,7) score higher on expressive motivation than Turkish 
speakers (mean = 5,4). 
 
6 Conclusion and discussion 
This small-scale study looked at the motivation people have to be involved as co-producers in a 
community building project in the city of Ghent, Belgium. We acknowledge some limitations that 
should be taken into consideration when discussing the findings. The main limitation is that we deal 
with a small sample size of 37 respondents. The reason is that we have a small single case study of a 
particular nature as research focus: co-production of community development in a deprived 
neighbourhood. Some of the participants of the project did not want to be part of the study, either 
out of fear for repercussions, or not willing to do the effort to fill out questionnaires or simply because 
they were radically against anything to do with what they perceive as ‘bureaucracy’. Still, with the help 
of ‘De Site’ employees we were able to find 37 respondents who were assisted and guided while going 
through the statements. This brings an important methodological issue to the surface: studying co-
production projects like these (community development in deprived areas and neighbourhoods), in 
which the majority of citizens/participants are in a vulnerable socio-economic position, may require 
special efforts of researchers to assist respondents very carefully in the data collection process.  
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Despite these limitations, we are able to present some preliminary conclusions. The evidence from 
our single case study shows that extrinsic personal motivations are the least influential triggers for 
people to co-produce. Rewards or sanctions are mentioned as motivators by the respondents in our 
case study, but to a lesser extent than two other clusters of motivations: intrinsic personal motivations 
and circumstantial motivations like ease of involvement and salience of the task/product. This might 
surprise, as this co-production project is largely based on material rewards through the use of a 
complementary currency. This conclusion is in line with the findings of Asquer (2013) and Alford 
(2002), who assume the minimal influence of extrinsic motivations to co-produce. Alford (2002, 2011) 
explains the logic behind this: citizens do not experience co-production positively when threatened. 
These extrinsic motivations are bad generators for the complex positive actions that essentially 
constitute co-production.  
Hence, at least in our case, intrinsic personal motivations are strong triggers to co-produce. As van Eijk 
and Steen (2014) explain, intrinsic motives assist in enhancing a person’s sense of competence and 
self-efficacy. In our case, normative motives, where citizens are guided by their base values and the 
solidarity motives, directly connected to citizens’ desire to socialize, are found to be important 
explanations for why people co-produce. This is also the case for another intrinsic motivation, 
effectiveness, where citizens evaluate the process of the engagement itself. Equally important 
motivators, next to the intrinsic motivation are the circumstantial motivations. Our case study shows 
that salience, i.e. whether or not the service is truly of importance for the citizen or their loved ones, 
and ease of involvement are very important to ‘make’ people co-produce. This can be explained in 
two ways. Firstly, in this particular project the citizens already work closely together with 
professionals. They know the professionals on a first-name basis and have little problem addressing 
them, so the gap is relatively small here. Secondly, as participating co-producers, they have easy access 
to information and will be the first to be made aware of changes, possibly even participating in the 
decision-making process. This concurs with the findings of Jakobsen (2013) who found that active 
stimulation and engagement by government (or other professional partners in the co-production 
process) may lower the threshold for people to participate in co-production. 
We also controlled these results for some personal attributes of co-producers. Although we 
acknowledge that we work with small-N subsamples here, there are some different motivational 
profiles depending on the ‘kind of’ co-producer we deal with. For example, when considering age, we 
noticed 55+ respondents are significantly more motivated by material rewards than their younger 
counterparts (between 18-34). These 55+ are also more motivated by the ease of involvement when 
compared to the age group 35-54. And the “inactive” co-producers were more motivated by material 
rewards than the “actively employed”. Future research might have attention to further explore how 
these personal attributes may interact with different kind of motivations to co-produce. 
To conclude, our study adds to the evidence that citizens are not just personal benefit maximizers. Co-
producers have far more complex reasons to participate. This must be kept in mind by policy makers 
when considering a new co-production project or adjusting an old one. Even when the co-production 
project is based on a rewards-system, as is the case in the project we studied, professionals should 
attempt to encourage the citizens with other, intrinsic, motives as well, perhaps even more so. It might 
be the case that personal extrinsic rewards may lower the threshold for people to co-produce, 
especially in the case of deprived neighbourhood regeneration projects. But perhaps it may also be 
the case that beyond material motivations, the perceived intrinsic benefits may be what keeps co-
producers coming back, making co-production initiatives more sustainable and effective. Testing this 
assumption, about the effect of combining extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, might be a fruitful 
avenue for further research in community development co-production projects. 
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8 Data 
8.1 Annex 1 : Original survey statements 
 
1. I participate to earn ‘Torekes’. 
2. ‘Torekes’ are a main source of income for me. 
3. I participate for another type of reward (if so, which?) 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Material rewards A = .79 
 
4. I participate because it helps my family 
5. My relationships with friends and family betters because of my involvement in 
this project. 
6. Through co-production I’m learning a lot. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Immaterial rewards C = .73 
 
7. I participate because I don’t want to be excluded from my community. 
8. If I don’t participate my friends would look down on me. 
9. I would feel guilty if I didn’t participate. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Immaterial sanctions D = .62 
 
10. I find it important to belong to a community. 
11. A lot of people in my neighbourhood already co-produce, so I started to as well. 
12. I feel happier when I can do something for my neighbourhood. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Solidary E = .55 
 
13. Co-producing is actually a habit, I don’t think about it that much. 
14. I believe everyone should participate in their neighbourhood. 
15. It’s my responsibility as well to work for my neighbourhood. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Normative F = .69 
 
16. I’m very interested in these kinds of community development projects. 
17. I think it can be very satisfying for people when they can do something for their 
neighbours.  
18. Participating gives meaning to my life. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Expressive G = .72 
 
19. I’ve noticed a change in our neighbourhood thanks to the ‘Torekes’. 
20. I know that my efforts will contribute to a better community. 
21. Because I participate, others will too.  
Cronbach’s Alpha for Effectiveness H = .67 
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22. There’s enough shops in my neighbourhood that provide information and aid 
about the ‘Torekes’. 
23. There’s a lot of information(folders, social media, website) about the Torekes, 
and I can easily find it. 
24. The professionals who work for the project are kind and easily accessible. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Ease of Involvement I = .77 
 
25. The project is important for me personally. 
26. The project is important for my friends and family.  
27. I believe if something’s important to you, you should spend time working for it. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for Salience J = .43 
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8.2 Annex 2 : Dutch & Turkish Survey 
○ man        ○ vrouw  Geboortejaar:.... 
Nationaliteit::…………………………………. Opleiding:……………………………………. 
Ik ben momenteel    ○ student (middelbaar / universiteit / hogeschool / volwassenenonderwijs) 
                                ○ werkende  (arbeider / bediende / zelfstandige / ambtenaar) 
                                ○ werkloos     
                                ○ met pensioen  (arbeider / bediende / zelfstandige / ambtenaar)               
                                ○ andere: ………… 
Ik word al ….. maanden betaald in Torekes. 
Scoor van 1 tot 7 hoe toepasselijk de volgende stellingen voor jou zijn. (1= helemaal mee oneens, 2= mee 
oneens, 3= een beetje mee oneens, 4= niet mee oneens/niet mee eens, 5= een beetje mee eens 6= mee 
eens 7= helemaal mee eens) 
1. Ik werk in de Site om Torekes te verdienen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Torekes zijn een belangrijke inkomstbron voor mij. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Ik doe het voor een ander soort beloning.(bv. gratis eten, producten, tuintjes…) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Ik werk in de Site opdat het mijn familie helpt. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Mijn relatie met vrienden en familie verbetert door mijn werk bij de Site 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Via de Site leer ik enorm veel bij. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Ik doe mee omdat ik niet wil uitgesloten worden in de gemeenschap. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Als ik niet meedoe dan zullen mijn buren/vrienden me minder appreciëren. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Ik zou me schuldig voelen als ik niet meedeed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Ik vind het belangrijk om tot een gemeenschap te behoren. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Veel mensen in mijn buurt werken al op de Site, dus ik ben ook begonnen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Ik voel me gelukkiger wanneer ik iets kan doen voor mijn gemeenschap. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Meewerken in mijn gemeenschap is eigenlijk een gewoonte, ik denk er niet zo 
veel over na. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. Ik vind dat iedereen zou moeten meewerken in zijn buurt. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Het is ook mijn verantwoordelijkheid om aan mijn buurt te werken. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Ik heb interesse in projecten zoals deze. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Ik denk dat mensen veel voldoening halen uit wat ze kunnen betekenen voor 
hun naaste. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. Werken op de Site geeft mijn leven zin. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. Ik merk veranderingen in de buurt sinds het Torekes-project begon. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. Ik weet dat mijn inspanningen helpen aan een betere gemeenschap. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. Omdat ik meedoe zullen anderen ook vlugger participeren. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. Er zijn genoeg loketten en winkels in mijn buurt die informatie en hulp voorzien 
over ‘Torekes’. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. Er wordt veel informatie (folders, sociale media, website) over het Torekes 
project gegeven en ik kan het makkelijk vinden. 
Wie/wat heeft jou geïnformeerd?.......................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. De professionelen die voor het Torekes project werken (en/of in de Site) zijn 
makkelijk aanspreekbaar. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. Mijn werk op de Site is belangrijk voor mij persoonlijk. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. Mijn werk op de Site is belangrijk voor mijn familie en/of vrienden.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. Ik geloof dat als iets belangrijk is voor jou, dat je er tijd en werk in zou moeten 
steken. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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○ erkek        ○ kadin  Dogum tarihi:.... 
Hangi irk:…………………………………. Tahsil durumu:……………………………………. 
Suan ben    ○  ogrenciyim (orta okul/universite / yüksek okul / acik ogretim) 
                                ○ calisiyor (isci/ memur / kendi isyeri)/ devlet memuru) 
                                ○ issiz     
                                ○ emekli (isci / memur / kendi isyeri / devlet memurur               
                                ○ diger: ………… 
Bana .... aydir Torekes ödemesi yapiliyor 
Assagidaki rakamlardan size uygun olani seciniz (1=kesinlikle katilmiyorum, 2= katilmiyorum, 3= biraz 
katilmiyorum, 4= katilmiyorumt , 5=biraz katiliyorum 6= katiliyorum 7= kesinlikle katiliyorum) 
1. Ben De Sitede Torekes kazanmak icin calisiyorum. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Torekes benim icin önemli bir gelir kaynagidir. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Ben baska türlü kazanc sagliyorum.(ôrnek bedava yemek, ürünler, bahceler,...) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Ben sitede aileme yardimci olmak icin calisiyorum. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Site calistigim zaman  , ailemle ve arkadaslarimla olan iliskilerim daha iyiyye 
gidiyor. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Sitede bir cok sey ögreniyorum. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Toplumdan dislanmamak icin sitede calisiyorum. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Sitede calismiyorsam komsularim veya arkadaslarim bunu takdir etmeyecekdir. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Eger birseyler yapmiyorsam kendimi borclu hissederim. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Topluma ait bir parca olmak benim icin onemlidir.. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Bir cok kisi sitede calisiyor ve buyuzden bende basladim. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Ne zaman cevrem icin birseyler yapsam kendimi mutlu hissediyorum. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Aslinda kendi toplulum icin calismak bir aliskanlikdir ve bunun uzerinde fazla 
dusunmem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. Herkes kendi mahallesi veya semti icin calismak zorundadir. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Kendi semtim icin calismak benim icin bir sorumluluktur. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Bu tur projelere karsi ilgiliyim. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Insanlar kendi komsulari icin birsey yaptiginda memmuniyet duyuyorlar. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. Sitede calismak hayatima anlam katiyor. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. Torekes projesi basladigindan beri semtimizde bir cok degisiklik goruyorum. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. Biliyorumki benim cabalarim toplumun daha iyi gelismesine yardimci olucak. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. Ben katildigim icin digerleride daha cabuk katilicakdir. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. Bilgi ve yardım sağlamak benim mahallede ofisleri ve mağazaları bol vardır 
‘Torekes’. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. Torekes projesinle ilgili yeterince bilgilendiriliyorum (ornek: brosür, sosyal 
medya, website) ve bunlari kolaylikla bulabilirim. 
Kim size ve ne igilendirdi?...................................................... 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. Torekes projesine veya De Site calisanlari rahatlikla konusubilirsiniz 
aanspreekbaar. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. Kendi kisiligim icin De Sitedeki isim benim icin cok önemli. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. Sitede iqim ailem icin veya arkadaslarim icin önemli 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. Inaniyorum ki birseye inaniyorsaniz, buna yeterince is ve zaman koymaniz gerek. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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8.3 Annex 3 : Paired Samples T-test 
 
Statistics 
 Material 
rewards 
A 
Immaterial 
rewards C 
Immaterial 
sanctions D 
Solidary E Normative 
F 
Expressive 
G 
Effectiven
ess H 
Ease 
I 
Salience  
J 
N Vali
d 
36 37 34 36 35 36 34 32 36 
Miss
ing 
1 0 3 1 2 1 3 5 1 
Mean 4,12 4,35 3,36 4,91 4,962 5,57 5,15 5,41 5,01 
Median 3,83 4,33 3,33 5,17 5,333 6,00 5,33 5,83 5,00 
Mode 3,00 6,00a 1,00a 6,00 6,00 7,00 5,00a 7,00 6,00 
SD 1,96 1,86 1,61 1,447 1,50 1,36 1,45 1,47 1,36 
 
A = C There is no statistically significant difference between material rewards & immaterial rewards. (p=.421) 
A = D There is no statistically significant difference between material rewards & immaterial sanctions. (p=.028) 
A < E Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards in comparison to solidary motives. (p=.014) 
A < F Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for normative motives. (p=.008) 
A < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for expressive motives. (p=.000) 
A < H Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for effectiveness. (p=.002) 
A < I Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than because it’s easy to get involved. (p=.001) 
A < J Citizens will co-produce statistically less for material rewards than for salience. (p=.020) 
C > D Citizens will co-produce statistically more for immaterial rewards than for immaterial sanctions. (p=.010) 
C = E There is no statistically significant difference between immaterial rewards & solidary motives. (p=.017)  
C = F There is no statistically significant difference between immaterial rewards & normative motives. (p=.024) 
C < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial rewards than for expressive motives. (p=.000) 
C = H There is no statistically significant difference between immaterial rewards & effectiveness. (p=.017) 
C < I Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial rewards than because it’s easy to get involved. (p=.002) 
C = J There is no statistically significant difference between immaterial rewards & salience. (p=.036) 
D < E Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for solidary motives. (p=.000) 
D < F Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for normative motives. (p=.000) 
D < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for expressive motives. (p=.000) 
D < H Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for effectiveness. (p=.000) 
D < I Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than because it’s easy to get involved. (p=.000) 
D < J Citizens will co-produce statistically less for immaterial sanctions than for salience. (p=.000) 
E = F There is no statistically significant difference between solidary motives & normative motives. (p=.745) 
E < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for solidary motives than for expressive motives. (p=.006) 
E = H There is no statistically significant difference between solidary motives & effectiveness. (p=.618) 
E = I There is no statistically significant difference between solidary motives & ease of involvement. (p=.036) 
E = J There is no statistically significant difference between solidary motives & salience. (p=.697), 
F < G Citizens will co-produce statistically less for normative motives than for expressive motives. (p=.009) 
F =H There is no statistically significant difference between normative motives & effectiveness. (p=.727) 
F = I There is no statistically significant difference between normative motives & ease of involvement. (p=.248) 
F = J There is no statistically significant difference between normative motives & salience. (p=.971) 
G = H There is no statistically significant difference between expressive motives & effectiveness. (p=.054) 
G = I There is no statistically significant difference between expressive motives & ease of involvement. (p=.454) 
G = J There is no statistically significant difference between expressive motives & salience. (p=.016) 
H = I There is no statistically significant difference between effectiveness & ease of involvement. (p=.337) 
H = J There is no statistically significant difference between effectiveness & salience. (p=.627) 
I = J There is no statistically significant difference between ease of involvement & salience. (p=.057) 
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8.4 Annex 4 : One way Anova 
 
 
 F-value (Sig) Mean (SD) Male Mean (SD) Female Post Hoc 
Material rewards 
A 
,682 (,415) 4,57 (1,88) 3,96 (2,00) Male=Female 
Immaterial 
rewards C 
,758 (,390) 3,94 (1,48) 4,53 (2,01) Male=Female 
Immaterial 
sanctions D 
,826 (,370) 3,73 (1,39) 3,19 (1,71) Male=Female 
Solidary E ,339 (,564) 5,12 (,98) 4,81 (1,62)  Male=Female 
Normative F ,566 (,457) 5,27 (1,31) 4,84 (1,58) Male=Female 
Expressive G ,966 (,333) 5,91 (1,34) 5,43 (1,36) Male=Female 
Effectiveness H ,300 (,587) 4,93 (1,58) 5,24 (1,42) Male=Female 
Ease I 1,106 (,301) 5,00 (1,80) 5,59 (1,31) Male=Female 
Salience J ,679 (,416) 4,73 (1,81) 5,13 (1,13) Male=Female 
Table 4. 1 Gender 
 
 F-value (Sig) Mean(SD) 
18-34 
Mean (SD) 
35-54 
Mean (SD) 
55+ 
Post Hoc 
Material 
rewards A 
4,163 (,024) 3,43 (1,79) 3,73 (2,10) 5,42 (1,47) 18-34<55+  
18-34 = 35-54 
35-54 = 55+ 
* 
Immaterial 
rewards C 
1,494 (,239) 3,69 (1,62) 4,86 (1,81) 4,64 (2,13) 18-34 = 35-54 = 55+  
Immaterial 
sanctions D 
3,097 (,059) 3,25 (1,61) 2,69 (1,34) 4,30 (1,60) 18-34 = 35-54 = 55+  
Solidary E 1,665 (,205) 4,46 (1,08) 4,83 (1,59) 5,51 (1,57) 18-34 = 35-54 = 55+  
Normative F 1,665 (,205) 4,40 (1,41) 5,30 (1,58) 5,37(1,45) 18-34 = 35-54 = 55+  
Expressive G ,423 (,658) 5,38 (1,58) 5,53 (1,45) 5,90 (,90) 18-34 = 35-54 = 55+  
Effectiveness 
H 
1,349 (,274) 4,82 (1,64) 4,97 (1,59) 5,77 (,83) 18-34 = 35-54 = 55+  
Ease I 3,729 (,036) 5,12 (1,42) 4,89 (1,71) 6,44 (,44) 35-54<55+  
18-34 = 35-54  
18-34 = 55+ 
* 
Salience J ,253 (,778)  4,95 (1,09) 4,86 (1,62) 5,27 (1,45) 18-34 = 35-54 = 55+  
*p≤ 0.05 
**p≤0.01 
Table 4. 2 Age 
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 F-value (Sig) Mean (SD) 
Inactive 
Mean (SD) 
Active 
Post Hoc 
Material 
rewards A 
8,664 (,006) 4,59 (1,79) 2,50 (1,71) Inactive>Active ** 
Immaterial 
rewards C 
,367 (,549) 4,25 (1,90) 4,71 (1,80) Inactive=Active  
Immaterial 
sanctions D 
1,926 (,175) 3,56 (1,57) 2,62 (1,68) Inactive=Active  
Solidary E ,119 (,733) 4,95 (1,55) 4,75 (1,08) Inactive=Active  
Normative F ,288 (,595) 5,04 (1,55) 4,71 (1,40) Inactive=Active  
Expressive G ,030 (,864) 5,59 (1,48) 5,50 (,85) Inactive=Active  
Effectiveness 
H 
,257 (,615) 5,22 (1,27) 4,92 (2,01) Inactive=Active  
Ease I ,003 (,960) 5,41 (1,58) 5,38 (1,13) Inactive=Active  
Salience J ,073 (,789) 4,98 (1,44) 5,12 (1,07) Inactive=Active  
*p≤ 0.05 
**p≤0.01 
Table 4. 3 Employment 
 
 F-value (Sig) Mean (SD)  
Dutch  
Mean (SD)  
Turkish 
Post Hoc 
Material 
rewards A 
7,205 (,011) 3,48 (1,67) 5,14 (2,00) Dutch < Turkish ** 
Immaterial 
rewards C 
,936 (,340) 4,11 (1,73) 4,71 (2,05) Dutch = Turkish  
Immaterial 
sanctions D 
6,075 (,019) 2,89 (1,44) 4,22 (1,60) Dutch < Turkish * 
Solidary E ,008 (,929) 4,89 (1,12) 4,93 (1,86) Dutch = Turkish  
Normative F 1,627 (,211) 4,68 (1,47) 5,33 (1,52) Dutch = Turkish  
Expressive G ,316 (,578) 5,68 (1,27) 5,42 (1,50) Dutch > Turkish * 
Effectiveness 
H 
4,751 (,037)  4,72 (1,62) 5,76 (,91) Dutch = Turkish  
Ease I 1,339 (,256) 5,16 (1,61) 5,77 (1,21) Dutch = Turkish  
Salience J 3,806 (,059) 4,65 (1,54) 5,51 (,87) Dutch = Turkish  
*p≤ 0.05 
**p≤0.01 
Table 4. 4 Language 
 
 
